Herd Behaviour as an Incentive Scheme by Nicolas Melissas
Herd Behaviour as an Incentive Scheme¤
Nicolas Melissas




This paper presents a model of technology invention in an emerging
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free-ride on the e®ort level of another manager who may invent a superior
technology. The more managers who adopt the standard technology, the
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11 Introduction
People often infer information out of the actions of other people. For example,
when making their purchasing decisions consumers often choose the most popu-
lar brand because they think that its popularity indicates a better price/quality
combination1. People do not go and eat in an empty restaurant, because they be-
lieve that the food quality is low. When arguing with someone, try to strengthen
your argumentation by claiming that everybody agrees with you on that point.
This trick (even if it is not true) often succeeds in convincing more reluctant minds
that you are right.
This tendency to base decisions largely on the observed decisions of other agents
has recently been modelled as information externalities. Banerjee (1992) and
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) (henceforth BHW) made the ¯rst mod-
els which stressed the ine±ciencies of these information externalities in a context
of social learning2. Both models consider a population of individuals each endowed
with a private, costless and imperfect signal concerning the desirability of a course
of action. People decide sequentially whether to adopt or reject a given course of
action. People observe which actions were taken by the persons who moved before
them, but they do not observe their signals. If enough individuals have adopted
the same behaviour, then each subsequent individual neglects her private signal
and herds on the actions of the ¯rst persons, because the informativeness of their
combined actions is higher than the informativeness of any one signal. More inter-
estingly they also showed that herding is quite likely to cause a "bad outcome", i.e.
an outcome where all (or the vast majority of all) players adopt an action which
ex post turns out to be suboptimal.
Subsequently a number of other papers appeared which also stressed the ine±-
ciencies entailed by information externalities in di®erent contexts of social learn-
ing. For example3 Chamley and Gale (1994) consider a set-up similar to BHW
except that all players have the possibility to wait in order to observe how many
1Caminal and Vives (1996) analyse a game where ¯rms engage in price competition in order
to become more popular and bene¯t from these information externalities.
2With a "context of social learning" we mean a context where one person must choose an
action out of a prespeci¯ed action set and which has, prior to her decision, the opportunity to
learn out of the choices made by her predecessors.
3The models we brie°y discuss in this paragraph are among the most famous ones, but the
list is certainly not exhaustive.
2players invest in the current period and to make their investment decision in the
next period based on superior information. They showed how in their context bad
outcomes and ine±cient waiting may occur in equilibrium. Avery and Zemsky
(1998) also consider a set-up similar to BHW except that they add a competitive
market maker in the picture which sets the price of an investment asset on the
basis of all available information. They show that due to herding short-run price
bubbles can occur provided that traders are uncertain about the precision of the
other traders' signals. Vives (1993) shows that in the presence of a continuous
action space in the long run bad outcomes do not arise, i.e. eventually everyone
will adopt the right action. However in the presence of noise (when observing the
actions of the other players) the rate of convergence towards the right action is slow.
To summarise, so far the literature on social learning mainly stressed di®erent inef-
¯ciencies (short-run price bubbles, bad outcomes, ine±cient waiting, slow learning,
...) entailed by information externalities. All these ine±ciencies are due to the fact
that players when choosing their actions rely too little on their private informa-
tion and too much on the public one. In this paper we argue that herding4 also
possesses some positive aspects in the sense that players may have less incentives
to wait in a herding environment.
We study the following set-up. We assume that a ¯xed number of ¯rms enter se-
quentially in an emerging market. Each ¯rm is run by one manager who maximises
his utility. Upon entrance in the market managers must choose a technology. Man-
agers can choose to adopt an "old" technology. Adopting this "old" technology
is easy: it doesn't require e®ort from the manager. Managers can also choose to
exert a high e®ort to check the existence of a new (and more pro¯table) technol-
ogy. With a probability p a new technology exists, which will always be found if
e®ort is provided. We assume that - due to switching costs - it's only pro¯table to
innovate upon entrance in the market. After the adoption of the old technology
it's only pro¯table for a ¯rm to imitate the new technology if it is invented by a
subsequent manager. Managers act strategically in the sense that they all may
wait, adopt the "old" technology in the hope to free-ride on the e®ort of another
manager inventing a better technology.
4From now on, with "herding" we mean a behaviour where one person observes the action(s)
of her predecessor(s), updates her prior beliefs and then has more incentives to imitate her
predecessor(s) knowing that her choice may ex post not be optimal. This de¯nition allows us to
classify Vives' (1993) paper also in the herding literature and it permits us to better explain the
originality of this paper.
3We ¯rst compute the (unique) equilibrium of our game if everyone observes the
e®ort levels and the technological choices of all their predecessors. In these cir-
cumstances there are no informational asymmetries and thus also no herding. In
this benchmark case all ¯rst movers wait and free-ride on the e®ort level of the
last manager. This benchmark case is thus characterised by a lot of free-riding5
and, as switching from the old to the new technology is ine±cient, note that in our
model free-riding is ine±cient. This free-riding is driven by our assumption that
the new technology is a public good. Once a manager invented the new technology,
by assumption it can be copied by all the other managers in the economy at no
cost. As inventing the new technology constitutes a costly activity all managers in
our model have a natural incentive to wait in order to free-ride on someone else's
e®ort level.
Next we assume that all managers only observe one another's technological choices
(and not one another's e®ort levels). We show how herding attenuates the free-
riding problems present in our benchmark case. The intuition goes as follows. Late
movers observe the early movers adopting the old technology. As they infer the
inexistence of the new technology out of their actions, this induces them to adopt
the old technology as well (in other words late movers tend to herd on the actions
of the early movers). Early movers realise that they have little possibilities to free-
ride on the e®ort level of late movers and this induces them to exert e®ort. This
paper thus highlights the existence of a trade-o® between herding and waiting (or
free-riding).
We also show that late entrants (who put a lower probability on the existence of
the new technology as compared to the one put by early entrants) may exert a
higher ex ante e®ort level than early entrants. This is because in equilibrium the
probability with which the second up to the last manager exert e®ort is deter-
mined by the interplay of two e®ects. The ¯rst e®ect, which we call the herd e®ect,
states that the more managers who adopt the old technology, the higher the prob-
ability that a previous manager unsuccessfully checked the existence of a superior
technology, the lower a manager's incentives to exert e®ort. As mentioned in our
5And with free-riding we mean that a manager takes an ine±cient action (i.e. adopts the
standard technology) in the hope to free-ride on the e®ort of another manager. Free-riding
and waiting are thus equivalent in our model and henceforth we will almost always denote this
behaviour by waiting.
4previous paragraph, this e®ect explains why with unobservable e®ort levels our
players have less incentives to wait. The second e®ect which we call the free-rider
e®ect states that late entrants know that they cannot rely too much on the e®ort
of a subsequent manager inventing a better technology. This e®ect ensures that
late entrants still face a lot of incentives to exert e®ort. We show that - depending
on the values of our exogenous parameters - the free-rider e®ect may dominate the
herd e®ect. In that case late entrants exert a higher ex ante e®ort level than early
ones.
In the following paragraphs we discuss more in depth how this paper relates to
other models in the literature of social learning. We discuss the other papers in
increasing order of relatedness.
Smith and S¿rensen (1997) study a set-up similar to the one of BHW (i.e. without
analysing issues of strategic waiting) in which they consider a social planner who
maximises the present value of all agents' utilities. In their paper a socially more
e±cient outcome is obtained when some players internalise their information ex-
ternality. They show that players can be induced to internalise their information
externalities by means of a simple set of history-contingent balanced-budget trans-
fers. In our paper information externalities are internalised because all players
know that - due to herding - they will be less able to free-ride on the e®ort levels
of subsequent movers.
Rob (1991) models dynamic entry in an emerging market. Potential entrants ob-
serve the actions (quantity choices) and the payo®s (pro¯ts) of the incumbent ¯rms
and out of this infer information concerning the realisation of an unknown demand
parameter. Due to an information externality the rate of entry in the emerging
market is lower than the socially optimal one. His model does not possess our main
insight that herding may act as an incentive device because in his model the act
of waiting does not entail any negative information externality. In his model an
information externality only occurs whenever a ¯rm enters in the emerging mar-
ket. If a ¯rm decides to wait (to gather information from the entry decisions of the
other ¯rms) this does not in°uence the remaining players' posteriors concerning
the pro¯tability of the market (and thus doesn't hamper their incentives to enter
the emerging market at a later date).
In Chamley and Gale (1994) some players receive an option which gives them the
5right to invest. The higher the realised state of the world, the higher the prob-
ability that each player receives an investment option and the higher the return
from the investment project. All players who possess an investment option have
the possibility to wait, to observe how many other players invested in the previous
period and to make an investment decision on the basis of more information. They
prove the existence of a unique equilibrium where all players who possess an in-
vestment option invest with a symmetric probability ¸ such that the informational
gain of waiting is o®set by the opportunity cost of waiting.
Herding does not reduce the scope of strategic waiting in their model. If in their
model all players would truthfully exchange their signals, then ¯rst best applies
i.e. everyone would take the correct ex ante investment decision in period one.
Why is it that in our model herding reduces the scope of strategic waiting and
not in theirs? Which crucial assumptions explain this di®erence? In our model we
assume (i) the existence of aggregate uncertainty (in Chamley and Gale's model if
the number of players becomes large there is no (or almost no) aggregate uncer-
tainty) and (ii) that the good state of the world becomes publicly known as soon
as one player exerts e®ort. To see that it are really these two assumptions which
make the crucial di®erence, take Chamley and Gale's model but assume that (i)
the economy is populated by a limited number of players who possess an imperfect
signal and (ii) the return of the investment project becomes publicly known as
soon as one player invests6. If players were to share truthfully their signals then
they would all possess the same posteriors. In this context - due to aggregate un-
certainty (due to the limited number of players) - everyone still has an incentive to
wait until someone else invests (and thereby resolving the aggregate uncertainty).
Assume now that our players do not exchange their signals (due for instance to
the absence of a certi¯cation technology). In that case if an optimist7 waits, other
players partly infer a bad signal out of this. As this hampers their future incentives
to invest, optimists have then less incentives to wait.
In Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) two oil ¯rms possess a private imperfect signal
concerning the pro¯tability of drilling an exploratory oil well. If one ¯rm drills,
then the other ¯rm costlessly observes whether there is oil or not and (in case of
success) makes a riskless investment decision in the next period. Both ¯rms wait
6Note that this merely represents the set-up analysed by Hendricks and Kovenock (1989).
7In Chamley and Gale, an optimist can be interpreted as a player who possesses an investment
option.
6in the hope to free-ride on the drilling cost of the other ¯rm. If one ¯rm delays
its drilling decision, this "signals" to the other ¯rm that it possesses a poor signal.
The subsequent downward revision of its prior may induce the other ¯rm to let its
lease expire without drilling any well (which is nothing else than the herd e®ect
we mentioned earlier). Herding does not act as an incentive scheme in their model
because they only work with a two-period model. In their model both ¯rms don't
care about each other's second-period posteriors because (by construction) they
cannot free-ride on each other's second-period drilling decision. This paper thus
shows that additional insights can be obtained when generalising their model to
N periods.
This paper is organised as follows. In section two we explain the basic assumptions
of our model. We ¯rst analyse the workings of our model under the assumption of
observable e®ort levels and observable technological choices (section 3). In section
4 we work under the assumption that players do not observe one another's e®ort
levels. First we illustrate how herding acts as an incentive device by focusing on
a simple equilibrium where only one manager exerts e®ort. Next (section 4.2) we
analyse the case where N managers exert e®ort (with a certain probability) in
equilibrium. Final comments are summarised in section 5.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a simple model of dynamic entry in an emerging market. Our model
counts two phases: a ¯rst one called the adoption phase and a second one called the
production phase. Throughout the paper time is discrete. In the adoption phase
we assume that in each di®erent period t =1 ;:::;K (K ¸ 2( K 2 I N)) one (and
only one) ¯rm enters in a market and makes her technological choice. Each ¯rm
is run by a risk neutral manager/entrepreneur who maximises an expected utility
function. Henceforth we call manager t, the manager who enters in the emerging
market at time t. Next, (after period K) in the production phase all managers
receive their payo®s by producing and selling their goods in a ¯nite market (which
lasts from period K +1u n t i lpe r i odK (K ¸ K +1( K 2 I N))).
Manager t must use a technology (chosen out of the set Tt 2f o;ng)f r o mh i s
time of entry until time K8. In the beginning of the ¯rst period T1 = fog. o
8Stated di®erently, manager t is not allowed to make his technological choice at time t0 >t .
7represents an "old" technology. One can best think of o as a technology which is
widely used in other industries, everyone knows how o works and everyone knows
its pro¯tability characteristics. Assume that Tt = fog.M a n a g e rt, before adopting
his technology, has then two options: he can either adopt o at no cost (i.e. without
exerting e®ort) or he can exert e®ort e to try to invent a new, more pro¯table
technology denoted by n. If manager t successfully invents n,t h e n8t0 ¸ t, Tt0
becomes equal to fng which implies that manager t (along with all his successors)
has no other option left than to adopt the new technology. Moreover we assume
that once n was invented, all previous managers instantaneously exchange their old
technology for the new one and stick to it until the end of the game9. If manager
t doesn't invent n,t h e nTt remains equal to fog and in the beginning of period
t +1 ,Tt+1 = fog. It is assumed that the new technology exists with a probability
p 2 (0;1) and will always be invented if it exists and if a manager exerts e®ort
e. We assume that if manager t invents n, all previous and subsequent managers
bene¯t from a knowledge spillover e®ect in the sense that they adopt n without
incurring the cost of e®ort (however previous managers who switch from o to n
incur a switching cost (see below)). The use of n (o) during the production phase
generates a total pro¯t of ¼(¢)( ¼). The "height" of ¼(¢) depends on whether or not
a manager had adopted o prior to his adoption of n. Formally, ¼(¢)i sd e t e r m i n e d
by the function ¼ : I1 ¡! I R where I1=fs;nsg represents an indicator function
which takes the value s (ns), whenever a manager switched from o to n (adopted
n from scratch).
We model the managers' utilities as a v.N.M. utility function. Suppose Tt = fog.I f
manager t decides to exert e®ort at time t his expected payo® equals E(Uje;ns)=
p:U(¼(ns)) + (1 ¡ p):U(¼) ¡ e (e>0). To hold matters simple, we assume that
U(¼)=0a n dt h a tU(¼(ns)) = 1, so E(Uje;ns)=p¡e. If an entrant exerts e®ort,
with probability p there exists a new technology which he will ¯nd (for sure) and
in the production phase this will give him a payo® equal to 1 ¡ e. However our
diligent manager may be unlucky because with probability (1 ¡ p) there does not
exist a new technology. In that case our manager must use o to operate in the
This assumption could best be defended by allowing all ¯rms to produce and sell their goods
from their time of entry on. However, this would imply that a manager's payo® would depend
on his time of entry, an unnecessary complication.
9This is a model about technology invention and how herding a®ects the time at which a
new technology gets discovered. Therefore we don't explicitly model how a new technology
spreads throughout the economy. Instead we exogenously assume that once someone invents n,
it automatically (and instantaneously) gets adopted by the other managers.
8emerging market. In the production phase he will then get a payo® equal to ¡e.
We also assume that - due to switching costs - U(¼(s)) = °<1. In order to
highlight the interesting features of our model, we suppose that:
A1: p>e .
Under assumption one all our (risk neutral) managers have an individual incentive
to exert e®ort at their time of entry. We also assume that all managers rather
imitate instead of innovate. This is captured by our following assumption:
A2: p ¡ e<p °
Assumption A2 states that given °, manager one rather waits (and never exerts
e®ort) and free-rides on the e®ort of the second manager, if he believes the second
manager will exert e®ort for sure. So A2 naturally introduces strategic waiting
in our model. If a manager who did not exert e®ort and adopted o in a previous
period decides to exert e®ort at time t,h eg e t sE(Uje;s)=p°¡e.W ea s s u m et h a t :
A3: p° < e
Assumption 3 is an important simplifying assumption. It ensures that in equilib-
rium managers only want to innovate at their time of entry. The main di®erence
between our exogenous queue assumption and the one present in Banerjee (1992)
and BHW (1992) is that in our model all managers still care about their successors'
actions. The precise repercussions of A3 will be discussed more in detail in the
next sections.
3 Observable e®ort levels and observable tech-
nological choices: A game of free-riding.
In this section we analyse our model under the assumption that all managers ob-
serve one another's e®ort levels and technological choices. The timing of our game
is explained below10:
10The timing of the game is explained under the restriction that managers only exert e®ort (i)
at their time of entry and (ii) if n had not yet been invented. By now it should be clear that
these restrictions are innocuous.
90) At time zero: nature decides whether n exists or not.
1) At time t: manager t enters in the market and observes Tt and the past e®ort
levels of all his predecessors. In case Tt = fog, manager t chooses his e®ort level.
If he invents n, Tt becomes equal to n, the new technology is immediately adopted
by manager t and copied by all his predecessors and subsequent followers.
2) Period K+1untilperiodK: managers receive their payo®s and the game ends.
We assumed that the new technology will always be invented if it exists and if a
manager exerts e®ort e. The inexistence of n is thus proven as soon as a manager
exerts e®ort and adopts o. Hence a manager only wants to exert e®ort (i) at his time
of entry, (ii) if none of his predecessors adopted n and (iii) if none of his predecessors
exerted e®ort. Therefore we de¯ne a strategy for manager t, qt, as a probability
with which manager t exerts e®ort at his time of entry if none of his predecessors
exerted e®ort. A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a (q1;q 2;:::;qK) such that
no manager has an incentive to deviate given the other managers' strategies. In
this case we obtain the following result:
proposition 1 Under A1, A2 and A3, with observable technological choices and
observable e®ort levels, the unique SPE of our game is: q1 = q2 = ::: = qK¡1 =0 ,
qK =1 .
Proof: Consider ¯rst the optimal decision of manager K. Manager K observes that
all his predecessors use the standard technology. But he also observes that none
of his predecessors exerted a high e®ort level. Therefore manager K knows that
if he exerts a high e®ort level with prior probability p he will ¯nd the superior
technology. Under A1, manager K wants to exert e®ort. As mentioned previously,
under A3 none of the K-1 ¯rst movers want to exert e®ort at time K. Therefore
q1 = q2 = ::: = qK¡1 =0 ,qK = 1 constitutes an equilibrium strategy. Under
A2 the ¯rst K ¡ 1 movers rather wait and free-ride on manager K's e®ort level.
Therefore q1 = q2 = ::: = qK¡1 =0 ,qK = 1 constitutes the unique (subgame
perfect) equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Note that proposition (1) crucially rests on A3. This can easily be illustrated with
an example where K =2 . I fp° ¸ e, q1 =1 ,q2 = 0 also constitutes a subgame
perfect equilibrium. To see this, suppose that manager one exerts no e®ort and
adopts o.C a l l q12 the probability with which manager one exerts e®ort at time
two. In the second period there are two ¯rms in the market with two managers
10who both have an incentive to exert e®ort. This subgame possesses three Nash
equilibria: q12 =1 ,q2 =0 ;q12 =0 ,q2 = 1 and there also exists a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium in which q12 =
p¡e
p° and q2 =
p°¡e
p° . If manager one at time one
anticipates that if he were to exert no e®ort, in period two they would either play
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium or the equilibrium q12 =1 ,q2 =0 ,t h e nm a n -
ager one rather exerts e®ort in period one. Therefore, if p° ¸ e (q1 =1 ,q2 =0 )
constitutes a SPE. The reader can easily generalise this insight to the case with
K managers, if p° ¸ e there are K di®erent equilibria with each time a di®erent
manager who exerts e®ort.
Proposition (1) shows that if all players have a lot of information at their disposal,
this will result in a lot of waiting. This result bears some close resemblance to the
one that was derived earlier by Rob(1991). Rob also models dynamic entry in an
emerging market under the assumption that all players observe all the incumbents'
payo®s and actions. As mentioned in the introduction in his model due to an in-
formation externality the rate of entry is lower than the socially optimal one (in
other words the equilibrium (just as in our model) is characterised by too much
waiting). In the remainder of the paper we will introduce herding in the model (i.e.
managers who "blindly" imitate the technological choices of their predecessors in
the hope that they exerted e®ort) by allowing for informational asymmetries. We
will see that in a herding environment our players have much less incentives to wait.
In this paper it's natural to take the case without any private information as our
benchmark one because of its sharp contrast with our non-benchmark case. Two
remarks. First, note that if in Banerjee (1992) or BHW (1992) all players would
observe one another's signals and actions, all players would ex ante take the most
e±cient action and ¯rst best would apply. So the choice of our benchmark case
makes it explicitly clear that herding only reduces the scope of strategic waiting
when in the absence of any private information, players would still have an incentive
to delay their (informative) actions. Second we could have chosen the case where
all players don't observe actions (i.e. technological choices) nor e®ort levels during
the adoption phase as our benchmark one. We expect that giving all players
the possibility to observe one another's technological choices during the adoption
phase, this should increase welfare and e±ciency (compared to the case where all
players don't observe anything in the adoption phase) because late movers would
then have the possibility to free-ride on the e®ort level of an early mover. However,
this result is not original nor surprising. Already in Banerjee (1992) and BHW
11(1992) late movers are better o® (in an ex ante sense) when they observe their
predecessors actions (as compared to the case where they don't observe anything)
because they may act with more information than their predecessors.
4 A waiting game with observable technological
choices and unobservable e®ort levels.
In this section we consider the same game as the one we analysed in our previ-
ous section except that now our players only observe one another's technological
choices and not one another's e®ort levels. A manager is called active if in equi-
librium he exerts e®ort with a strictly positive probability. In this case we de¯ne
a strategy for manager t, qt, as a probability with which manager t exerts e®ort
at his time of entry if none of his predecessors adopted n (in all the other cases a
manager strictly prefers not to exert e®ort). As e®ort levels are unobservable this
is a dynamic game of imperfect information. Each manager - upon observing his
predecessors adopting the old technology - must have a belief concerning which
node in the game tree was reached. If a manager believes that at least one of his
predecessors exerted e®ort, then he rather adopts the old technology without ex-
erting e®ort. In this model beliefs concerning past e®ort levels matter because they
ultimately in°uence pt = Prob[n existsjt¡1 ¯rst managers use o], which in its turn
in°uences manager t's incentives to exert e®ort. Therefore we de¯ne our equilib-
rium concept using each manager's posterior (concerning the existence of the new
technology) instead of working directly with his beliefs concerning past e®ort lev-
els. P =( p;p2;:::;pK), Q =( q1;q 2;:::;qK)a n dQ¡t =( q1;q 2;:::;qt¡1;q t+1;:::;q K).
A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a (Q;P)s u c ht h a t :
(i) given pt and Q¡t, manager t cannot gain by deviating 8t,a n d
(ii) given Q, pt is computed via Bayes' law, 8t.
We now analyse equilibrium strategies in our game. We ¯rst focus on an equilib-
rium with one active manager which already shows how in this model herding acts
as an incentive device. Next we generalise our results to N (1 <N· K)a c t i v e
managers.
4.1 An equilibrium with one active manager.
Our main result with one active manager is summarised below:
12proposition 2 Under A1 and A2, there exists a SPE in which only the ¯rst
manager is active and where q1 =1 .
Proof: Suppose all managers revise their priors under the assumption that q1 =1 ,
q2 = q3 = ::: = qK = 0. It is then quite easy to see that under this assumption it's
optimal for manager one to exert e®ort with probability one. Suppose manager one
deviates exerts no e®ort and adopts o. Manager two at his time of entry observes
that manager one adopted o. His expected gain of exerting e®ort equals: P(n
existsj man. 1 uses o)¡e = p2 ¡ e,w h e r e :
p2 =
(1 ¡ q1)
(1 ¡ q1)+q1(1 ¡ p)
p (1)
Manager two computes p2 by replacing q1 in (1) by 1. Therefore p2 =0 . T h i s
is logical: manager two is sure that manager one exerted e®ort. Therefore he
interprets manager one's act of adopting o as a "proof" that n does not exist.
Since p2 =0<e , q2 = 0. Manager three observes that the ¯rst two managers
adopted o. Using Bayes' law he computes his posterior p3 =P ( n exists j ¯rst two
man. use o):
p3 =
(1 ¡ q1)(1 ¡ q2)
(1 ¡ q1)(1 ¡ q2)+[ 1¡ (1 ¡ q1)(1 ¡ q2)](1 ¡ p)
p (2)
in which he substitutes q1 by one and q2 by zero. Hence p3 =0<eand con-
sequently q3 = 0. All subsequent movers compute the same posterior (p4 =
p5 = ::: = pK = 0) and therefore it's optimal for them not to exert any e®ort
(q4 = q5 = ::: = qK = 0). Manager one knows this. Correctly anticipating that
q2 = q3 = ::: = qK = 0, manager one knows that he is the only one for whom
it is pro¯table to exert e®ort. Hence it is optimal for him to exert e®ort with
probability one.
Of course this is not the unique equilibrium with one active manager. For example
there also exists a SPE in which only the second manger is active and where q2 =1
(under A2 it is indeed optimal for manager one to set q1 = 0 and to free-ride on
the e®ort level of the second manager). As a matter of fact with only one active
manager there exist K equilibria with each time a di®erent manager who exerts
e®ort for sure, but none of them entail more waiting than the (unique) equilibrium
we obtained when e®ort levels were observable. Q.E.D.
13Intuitively, the strategy in which only the ¯rst manager exerts e®ort for sure con-
stitutes a SPE because manager one - knowing that if he adopts o,s u b s e q u e n t
movers will revise downward their prior probabilities and will never exert e®ort -
internalises his information externality by exerting e®ort. Therefore in equilibrium
one obtains less waiting. Note also that proposition (2) does not rely at all on A3,
even if ° were equal to one, the strategies described in the proposition would still
constitute a SPE.
4.2 An equilibrium with N (1 <N· K) active managers.
4.2.1 An existence and uniqueness theorem.
With N managers, all managers compute their equilibrium probabilities out of
the following set of N +( N ¡ 1) nonlinear simultaneous equations. The ¯rst N
equations merely state that our N managers must choose their e®ort levels such
that everyone, given their posteriors, is indi®erent between the two pure strategies:











pN¡1 ¡ e = qNpN¡1°
pN = e
The remaining (N ¡ 1) equations determine the posteriors of manager two to
manager N (since p1 = p, the "posterior" of the ¯rst manager is exogenously given





k=1(1 ¡ qk)p +( 1¡ p)
p 8j =2 ;:::;N
We can now state our most interesting ¯nding:
proposition 3 Under A1, A2 and if ° · Maxf
e
p;1 ¡ eg, for every set of man-
agers, there exists a unique SPE where they are all active.
14Proof: see appendix one and two
Our game thus clearly exhibits multiple equilibria in the sense that di®erent sets
of active managers lead to di®erent SPE.11 This multiplicity does not bother us in
the sense that no equilibrium of our game with non-observable e®ort levels entails
more waiting than the unique equilibrium we obtained with observable e®ort levels.
Before explaining the intuition behind proposition (3) more in detail, we ¯rst
illustrate it with a simple example with two active managers
4.2.2 An illustration with two active managers.
Assume it are the ¯rst two managers who must be active. Both managers compute
their equilibrium probabilities out of the equations:
p ¡ e = q2p° (3)
p2 = e
where p2 is determined by equation (1). Out of (3), we see that q2 =
p¡e
p° 2 (0;1).
Out of (1), one can easily see that q1 =
p¡e
p(1¡e) 2 (0;1). Note that q2 is a decreasing
function of °. This is logical: manager one is only indi®erent between innovation
and imitation if every increase in the switching cost (decrease in °)i sc o m p e n -
s a t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nq2.I f ° is low enough (lower than 1 ¡ e) this implies
that manager two in equilibrium exerts a higher (ex ante) e®ort level (which is





q3 = q4 = ::: = qK = 0 constitutes a SPE we still must check that no manager
(not even the ¯rst two managers) has an incentive to exert e®ort after observing
manager two adopting o.
First assume that p° · e. Under this assumption the ¯rst two managers don't
want to exert e®ort from date three on. Manager three computes his posterior
using (2) in which he substitutes q1 and q2 by their equilibrium values. As q2 > 0,
p3 <p 2 = e.H e n c e q3 =0 . A sp r e v i o u s l y ,p4 = p5 = ::: = pK = p3 and
q4 = q5 = ::: = qK = 0. So the third up to the last manager always adopt the
same technology as the one which was adopted by manager two. The ¯rst two
11Specifying a model with an endogenous queue should not limit the number of equilibria.
Admittedly, an endogenous queue should yield a unique symmetric equilibrium, but should also
possess a large number of asymmetric equilibria.
15managers - even though they both prefer to imitate instead of innovate - correctly
anticipate that they won't be able to free-ride on the e®ort levels of subsequent
movers. Therefore they are indi®erent between the two pure strategies and they
may as well choose to exert e®ort with a strictly positive probability. Hence, if
p° · e, there exists a unique SPE in which only the ¯rst two managers are active.
However, even if p° > e, there may still exist a SPE in which only the ¯rst two
managers are active and exert e®ort with probabilities q1 =
p¡e
p(1¡e) and q2 =
p¡e
p° .T o
see this suppose that e
p <°· 1 ¡ e. We know that if ° · 1 ¡ e, q2 ¸ q1. Suppose
both managers don't exert e®ort and adopt the standard technology. Consider
both managers in the third period. What induces them to exert e®ort (given that
they know their own e®ort levels)? Nothing! Manager one observed that the sec-
ond manager adopted the standard technology. In the third period manager one
computes his posterior p13 =
(1¡q2)p
(1¡q2)+q2(1¡p).N o wp13 · e (and thus p13°<e .T h i s
is logical: manager one's posterior (at time three) is not higher than the one of
manager two (who was already indi®erent) because q2 ¸ q1. Hence manager one,
upon observing manager two adopting the standard technology has no incentive
anymore to exert e®ort. Manager two doesn't want to exert e®ort in any subse-
quent period either because p2 = e.H e n c ei f° · 1 ¡ e both managers know that
they won't be able to free-ride on the e®ort level of a manager (including their own
e®ort level) after the second period. Given that they are indi®erent, they may as
well choose to exert e®ort with a strictly positive probability.
Note that the third up to the last manager never exert e®ort and adopt the same
technology as the one which was adopted by the ¯rst two managers. Note that this
herd may be misdirected because with a probability (1 ¡ q1)(1 ¡ q2)p all ¯rms in
the emerging market end up using the old technology when a new one exists, but
which was not invented by a diligent manager. This explanation of how an industry
can get "stuck" with a suboptimal technology was already o®ered by Hendricks
and Kovenock (1989). J.Zwiebel (1995) explains this observation on the basis of
reputational concerns.
4.2.3 Herd e®ect versus free-rider e®ect.
In these paragraphs we provide an answer to questions like: what is the intuition
behind proposition (3) and which "forces" in°uence the equilibrium e®ort level of
each active manager?
16Before answering these questions we ¯rst introduce some new notations. zt de-
notes the probability with which manager t will not exert e®ort (i.e. zt =1¡ qt).
j 2 I N and j =2 ;:::;N. Zj+1 denotes the probability that no manager mov-
ing after manager j will search for the new technology (i.e. 8j =2 ;:::;N ¡ 1,
Zj+1 = zj+1:zj+2:::zN and if j = N, ZN+1 = 1). Furthermore we de¯ne NEj¡1
as p=pj.I n o t h e r w o r d s NEj¡1 denotes the negative externality induced by the
actions of the j ¡ 1 ¯rst managers on manager j's posterior. NEj¡1 > 1 8j and
NEj¡1 is strictly increasing in j.W ed e ¯ n eRoe (return on e®ort) as p=e.
All active managers must be indi®erent between the two pure strategies, i.e. pj¡1¡








(where C =( 1¡ 1
°)a n dNE2¡2 = NE0 =1 )E q u a t i o n( 4 )s h o w st h a tqj is a
function of two opposing e®ects (or "forces").
The ¯rst e®ect, which we call the herd e®ect, is captured by the term NEj¡2.
NEj¡2 is increasing in j and qj is decreasing in NEj¡2: the more one advances
in the queue, the higher the sum of the expected e®orts spent by all previous
managers, the lower the posterior of manager j ¡1, the lower the probability with
which manager j must exert a high e®ort to make manager j¡1 indi®erent (ceteris
paribus). This herd e®ect is similar to the one present in the other herding models
(Banerjee (1992), BHW(1992), Chamley and Gale (1994), Vives (1993), Hendricks
and Kovenock (1989), Scharfstein and Stein (1990), ...). However in this model,
due to the herd e®ect, all N managers realise that they won't be able to free-ride
too much on the e®ort levels of their successors. Proposition (3) then shows that
by appropriately choosing all e®ort probabilities one can make all N managers in-
di®erent between the two pure strategies and thus willing to randomise. Therefore
our model highlights a trade-o® between herding versus waiting which went unno-
ticed in the current herding literature. The fundamental reason why this insight is
not present in Rob (1991), Chamley and Gale (1994) and Hendricks and Kovenock
(1989) was already explained in the introduction.
In our model the herd e®ect also gives birth to a countervailing force which we
call the free-rider e®ect. This free-rider e®ect is captured by the term Zj+1. Zj+1
is increasing in j,a n dqj is increasing in Zj+1. This is also logical: the more one
17advances in the queue, the lower the probability that manager j ¡ 1c a nh o p et o
free-ride on the e®ort of a subsequent manager (due to the herd e®ect), the higher
the probability with which manager j should exert a high e®ort to make manager
j ¡1 indi®erent. This free-rider e®ect thus ensures that late movers may still face
a lot of incentives to exert e®ort.
Equation (4) also shows that manager j's equilibrium behaviour can be summarised
by the following rule: "manager j takes pj¡1 and Zj+1 as given and chooses qj such
that manager j ¡ 1 is indi®erent between the two pure strategies".12 This simple
rule also provides a partial intuition why, once we ¯x the set of active managers,
there exists a unique vector of equilibrium probabilities. Zj+1 is ¯xed such that
manager j is indi®erent. Since qj¡1 > 0 (otherwise manager j ¡ 1 is not active),
pj¡1 >p j. Therefore if qj = 0, manager j ¡ 1 rather exerts e®ort, if qj =1 ,m a n -
ager j ¡1 rather waits. By continuity, there exists a unique qj such that manager
j ¡ 1 is indi®erent.
One ¯nal word of explanation concerning our assumption A3. As explained above,
proposition (3) does not fully rely on A3: for high enough a 1¡e, that proposition
remains valid even with "low" or "moderate" switching costs. However, the main
insight of this paper is that a herding environment may be less prone to prob-
lems of strategic waiting than a non-herding one. This was shown by comparing
proposition (3) to proposition (1). As proposition (1) crucially rests on A3, our
main insight crucially hinges on this assumption. Nonetheless we believe our main
insight to be robust in the sense that we can specify two other realistic contexts
in which our main insight remains valid and would not depend on A3. First, we
c a nw o r ki nac o n t e x tw h e r e° = 1, where the queue is endogenous and where all
players face a discount factor ±<1. Second, in the introduction we already men-
tioned that our main insight can be recovered without the use of A3 in Chamley
and Gale's model provided that we allow for (i) aggregate uncertainty and (ii) the
state of the world which becomes publicly known as soon as one player invests.
12The intuition behind manager one's behaviour is more complicated and is not explained in
this paper. Somewhat surprisingly it turns out that manager one chooses q1 such that manager
N is indi®erent. The intuition why manager one is able to make the last manager indi®erent was
explained in a previous version of this paper titled "Corporate Conservatism as Endogenous Pes-
simism" and can be obtained by simple request from the author. For a mathematical explanation
see proposition (6) in appendix one.
184.2.4 The temporal pro¯le of equilibrium e®ort probabilities.
In this subsection we check when the free-rider e®ect dominates the herd e®ect
(i.e. when late movers exert a higher ex ante e®ort level than early movers).
proposition 4 In equilibrium: q1 · q2 · ::: · qN if and only if ° · 1 ¡ e,a n d
q1 >q 2 > ::: > qN if and only if °>1 ¡ e
Proof:
From appendix one we know that we can rewrite our system of N +( N ¡ 1) si-
multaneous equations into a simpler set of N equations in N unknowns:
·2 + °z2z3:::zN = ·1
·2z1 + °z1z3:::zN = ·1
·2z1z2 + °z1z2z4:::zN = ·1
. . .
·2z1:::zN¡1 + °z1:::zN¡1 = ·1
where ·2 =1¡ ° ¡ e 2 (¡1;+1), ·1 = e
1¡p
p 2 (0;1)
Assume that ° · 1 ¡ e. Then the ¯rst terms on the LHS of the equations form
a decreasing sequence (·2 ¸ ·2z1 ¸ ::: ¸ ·2z1:::zN¡1), so the second terms on the
LHS must form an increasing sequence: z2z3:::zN · z1z3z4:::zN · z1z2z4z5:::zN ·
::: · z1:::zN¡1. Simplifying these inequalities we get: z1 ¸ z2, z2 ¸ z3, ... ,
zN¡1 ¸ zN implying that q1 · q2 · ::: · qN which is our result. The proof for
°>1 ¡ e is similar except that the ¯rst term of the LHS now forms a strictly
increasing sequence and therefore: q1 >q 2 > ::: > qN.Q.E.D.
The intuition behind proposition (4) was already set forth in an earlier part of this
paper. With two active managers we saw that if ° is relatively low, manager one
was only indi®erent between the two pure strategies if the high switching cost was
compensated by a higher q2. For low enough a °, q1 <q 2. Proposition (4) shows
that this result can be generalised to the case with N active manager.
We believe proposition (4) to be an interesting one because it proves a quite coun-
terintuitive result that late movers (who put a lower probability on the existence
of n than early movers) may - depending on the values of the parameters - exert
higher ex ante e®ort levels than early movers.
195 Conclusions
This paper analysed a waiting game with information externalities. We di®ered
from other papers which introduced information externalities in waiting games
(see in particular Chamley and Gale (1994) and Gul and Lundholm (1995)) in two
important aspects. First we assumed the existence of aggregate uncertainty and
second, we assumed that the good state of the world becomes (publicly) known as
soon as one manager exerts e®ort. In the absence of informational asymmetries
the equilibrium exhibits a lot of strategic waiting because all players wait until
the last manager exerts e®ort and resolves the aggregate uncertainty. With un-
observable e®ort levels all managers (except the ¯rst one) revise downward their
priors because they infer out of the conservative behaviour of their predecessors
the unavailability of the new technology. As all players (except the ¯rst one) re-
vise downward their prior probabilities, this hampers their incentives to innovate.
Early movers correctly anticipate that if they adopt the old technology, they will be
less able to free-ride on the e®ort levels of one of their successors and this induces
them to exert e®ort. Therefore this paper shows that in the presence of aggregate
uncertainty and if the good state of the world becomes publicly known as soon as
one player invests, there exists a trade-o® between herding and waiting which has
not been stressed before by other models which introduced informational external-
ities in waiting games (see a.o. Rob (1991), Chamley and Gale (1994), Gul and
Lundholm (1995), Hendricks and Kovenock (1989), ...). Finally, we also showed
that if switching costs are relatively high late movers exert a higher ex ante e®ort
level than early movers. We believe this last result to be counterintuitive in the
sense that early movers put a higher probability on the existence of the new tech-
nology as compared to the one put by late movers.
This paper analysed strategic waiting under the assumption that managers only
want to innovate at their time of entry. One may want to relax that assumption
and work instead with an endogenous-queue model. We believe this constitutes an
interesting topic for future research.
As we mentioned in our introduction, the context in our paper is most realistic if
one considers the oil exploration industry. Our framework can also be applied to
the timing of compatibility decisions between two technologies: a ¯rm selling tech-
nology A may be induced to search for a technology which would make technology
A and B mutually compatible because by not searching she may discourage the
20other ¯rm from doing so. In our opinion, our theory may be applied to other eco-
nomic ¯elds as well. For instance the hold-up problem (or more generally problems
due to moral hazard in teams) may become less severe in a herding environment
because individuals realise that if they don't work enough this may reveal some bad
information and this will discourage others from working hard too. In that case
our theory can also be applied to the ¯eld of (complete and incomplete) contract
theory. Similarly, organisations may structure themselves such as to introduce
information externalities in their organisations which may induce some people to
work. We believe all this to constitute an avenue for future research.
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22Appendix one
by N.Melissas and M.Pauly
In this appendix we prove our existence and uniqueness theorem as stated in propo-
sition (3). We work here under the assumption that managers only exert e®ort
at their time of entry. In appendix 2 we prove that if ° · Maxfe
p;1 ¡ eg in
equilibrium managers only want to exert e®ort at their time of entry. We start by
reducing our system of N +(N ¡1) simultaneous equations into a more tractable
set of N equations in N unknowns. To illustrate our way of working, consider
the ¯rst equation: p ¡ e = q2p° + z2q3p° + z2z3q4p° + ::: + z2:::zN¡1qNp° (where
zt =1¡ qt). This equation can be rewritten as: p ¡ e =( 1¡ z2z3:::zN)p°.T h i s




Similarly we can rewrite equation t as: (1 ¡ °)+°zt+1:::zN = e
pt (if t = N then
zN+1 =1 ) . R e p l a c i n g 1
pt by 1 + c
z1:::zt¡1 (where c =
1¡p
p )i nt h i sl a s te q u a t i o nw e
get ·2z1:::zt¡1 + °z1:::zt¡1zt+1:::zN = ·1. We thus obtain the following set of N
simultaneous equations:
·2 + °z2z3:::zN = ·1 (5)
·2z1 + °z1z3:::zN = ·1 (6)




·2z1:::zN¡2 + °z1:::zN¡2zN = ·1
·2z1:::zN¡1 + °z1:::zN¡1 = ·1 (7)
de¯nition: We say that (z1;:::;zN) is an equilibrium if zt, computed out of our
system of N simultaneous equations, 2 (0,1) 8t
We ¯rst state and prove our Uniqueness Theorem.
proposition 5 (Uniqueness Theorem) There cannot be more than one equilib-
rium.
23Proof:
Suppose there are two equilibria (z1;::::;zN)a n d( z0
1;:::;z0
N). Assume that z0
1 >z 1.
Out of the ¯rst equation we know that z0
2:::z0
N = z2:::zN = ·1¡·2
° . Out of the second
equation we know that ·2z1 + °
z1z2:::zN













2 >z 2. Similarly, we learn from equation t that z0
t >z t. But this contra-
dicts that z0
2:::z0
N = z2:::zN = ·1¡·2
° .I fz0
1 = z1, it's easy to show that 8tz 0
t = zt
and that both equilibria are equal.Q.E.D.














where a = ·1¡·2
° .
Note that the system of equations starting from (8) to (and including) (9) merely
represent a rewriting of the system of equations starting from (6) to (and includ-
ing) (7). Note also that equation (5) does not intervene in our de¯niton of our
candidate equilibrium. Therefore, every equilibrium is a candidate-equilibrium (to
see this, replace (5) by z2z3:::zN = a = ·1¡·2
° a n di n s e r ti ti na l lt h es u b s e q u e n t
equations). However, every candidate equilibrium constitutes an equilibrium only
if:
(a) all the zt 6=1 ,
(b) z2z3:::zN = ·1¡·2
°
O u rn e x tp r o p o s i t i o ns h o w st h a to n c ew ek n o wz1, we are able to compute all the
remaining z0
js (j =2 ;:::;N).
proposition 6 8 ® 2 (0;1], there exists one and only one candidate equilibrium
such that z1 = ®.
24Proof:




Note that ·1 ¡ ·2 > 0, because of A2. Therefore z2 2 (0;1]. We can see from
equations (8) to (and including) equation (9) that zj 2 (0;1] 8j. Q.E.D.
We know enough now to state our last proposition.
proposition 7 (Existence Theorem) Under A1, A2 and A3, 8N>1 there exists
an equilibrium vector (z1;:::;zN).
Proof:
Assume that z1 = 1. Then out of our system of equations starting from (8) to (and
including) (9) we know that z2 = z3 = ::: = zN = 1 (because ·2 + °a = ·1). But
then z2:::zN =1> ·1¡·2
° (the reader can easily verify that under A1: ·1¡·2 <° ).
Assume now that z1 <²(where ² represents an arbitrarily small strictly positive





















² =m i n
j f²jg > 0
Then 8z1 · ², zj <a
1
N¡1 8j.
In that case , z2:::zN <a .
We know that the function f : z1 2 (0;1) ! z2:::zN 2<is a continuous one
because 8j, zj is a continuous function of z1 and we know that the product of con-
tinuous functions also yields a continuous function. We also know that f(1) >a
and f(²) <a . Hence there exists at least one z1 2 (0;1) such that f(z1)=a.
Q.E.D.
25Appendix two
In this appendix we prove that if (su±cient condition) ° · Maxfe
p;1 ¡ eg all
active managers only want to exert efort at their time of entry. If p° < e,t h e n
by assumption each manager only wants to exert e®ort at his time of entry. If
p° ¸ e,t h e nw em u s tc h e c kw h e t h e ra na c t i v em a n a g e rh a sn oi n c e n t i v et oe x e r t
no e®ort at his time of entry, to wait untill some of (or possibly all) his (active)
succesors made their technological choices and to exert e®ort at a future date. To
analyse this kind of strategic behaviour we study the following variant of our game.
0) At time zero, nature decides whether n exists or not.
1) Manager one enters in the market and chooses his e®ort level. He only adopts
o in case he doesn't invent n.
2) Manager two enters in the market and observes the technological choice and the
past e®ort level of the ¯rst manager. In case manager one adopted o, the ¯rst two
managers choose simultaneously their e®ort levels. If one of them invents n,i t ' s
immediately copied by the other one.
3) In each subsequent period (untill period K), one additional manager enters in
the market. In case all previous managers adopted o, all managers present in
the market choose simultaneously their e®ort levels. If a manager invents n,i t ' s
immediately adopted by him and copied by all his predecessors and subsequent
followers.
4) In period K +1 no manager enters in the market. In case all managers adopted
o, all active managers choose simultaneously their e®ort levels. In case n gets in-
vented, it automatically spreads throughout the economy.
5) In period K + 2 untill period K (K ¸ K + 2): managers receive their payo®s
and the game ends.
Assume that p° = e. Assume it are the ¯rst N managers who are active. As q1 > 0
(otherwise manager one wouldn't be active) pj°<e(j =2 ;:::;N). Assume man-
ager one did not exert e®ort at time one and assume that the second one adopts
o. At time three manager one strictly prefers to exert no e®ort because, as q2 > 0,
p13°<e . Hence at time two manager one has two options: (i) exert e®ort at time
two (which yields a payo® equal to p° ¡e = 0) or (ii) never exert any e®ort untill
the end of the game. As 0 < (1 ¡ Z2)p°, manager one only wants to exert e®ort
at time 1.
Assume now that e
p <°· 1 ¡ e. l =1 ;:::;t. plt denotes manager l's posterior at
26time t if prior to manager t's e®ort decision Tt = fog and if manager l at his time
of entry did not exert e®ort. Consider manager l at time t. What induces manager
l to exert e®ort at time t?I splt° ¡ e · (1 ¡ Zt)plt°? Suppose ¯rst that l = t ¡ 1.
Note that pt¡1t¡1 = pt¡1t (manager t¡1 knows that he did not exert any e®ort at
time t ¡ 1, therefore his act of adopting o doesn't a®ect his posterior probability
concerning the existence of n). Now pt¡1t° ¡ e<p t¡1t¡1 ¡ e =( 1¡ Zt)pt¡1t°.
Hence, due to switching costs manager t ¡ 1 strictly prefers not to exert e®ort at
time t. Assume next that l<t¡1. Manager l d o e s n ' tw a n tt oe x e r te ® o r ta tt i m e
t either if (s.c.) plt° ¡ e · pt¡1t° ¡ e or if plt · pt¡1t.N o w ,
plt =
z1z2:::zl¡1zl+1:::zt¡1
z1z2:::zl¡1zl+1:::zt¡1p +( 1¡ p)
p ·
z1z2:::zl¡1zlzl+1:::zt¡2
z1z2:::zl¡1zlzl+1:::zt¡2p +( 1¡ p)
p = pt¡1t
if and only if zt¡1 · zl or i® qt¡1 ¸ ql. From proposition (4) we know that this is
the case as soon as ° · 1 ¡ e.
Consider now all managers at time K + 1 and assume that everyone adopted o.
Using a reasonning similar to our previous one, the reader can easily check that if
° · 1 ¡ e, manager t (t<N ) doesn't want to exert e®ort at time K +1b e c a u s e
ptK+1 · pN = e.Q.E.D.
27